The gap in most AI agent deployments is not logging. It is that there is no control point between the agent deciding to act and the action completing. By the time a tool call executes, a file is written, or an API request leaves the network, the opportunity to enforce policy has already passed.
Vaikora sits inline between an AI agent and every LLM call or tool invocation it makes. Before execution, it evaluates the action against configured policy and returns one of four decisions: allow, block, modify, or require-approval. The action either proceeds, is rewritten to comply, waits for a human decision, or stops entirely. Nothing executes before that decision is made.
Why "Inline Before Execution" Is the Only Meaningful Control Point
Detection after the fact has a fixed problem: the action already happened. If an AI agent exfiltrated a file, queried a restricted database, or sent a request to an external endpoint, a post-execution alert tells you what occurred. It does not undo it.
Placing a control plane inline changes the architecture. The agent cannot act unless Vaikora returns a permit. This means policy is enforced, not observed. The distinction matters for security operations teams trying to prevent incidents rather than respond to them, and it matters for compliance teams who need to show auditors that controls exist at the point of action.
Vaikora ships six content inspection modules that run as part of this inline evaluation. They cover things like sensitive data patterns, prompt injection signals, and policy scope violations. The modules run before the downstream call is made.
What the Policy Decision Looks Like in Practice
Consider an AI agent configured to assist employees with HR queries. It has access to an HR database through a tool call. Without a runtime gate, the agent can query any record the tool’s service account can reach, constrained only by whatever the HR application itself permits.
With Vaikora inline, you define a policy that restricts that agent’s queries to records matching the authenticated user’s own employee ID, blocks any attempt to retrieve salary fields for other employees, and flags requests for headcount or workforce planning data as requiring approval before execution. The same agent, the same LLM, the same tool, but the actual scope of what executes is now under governance.
Identical input always produces an identical policy decision. This is what "deterministic" means in practice: there is no probabilistic judgment in the enforcement layer. The evaluation is rule-based and consistent.
Vaikora supports 12 LLM providers with no SDK migration. You route calls through the Vaikora gateway; the existing application code does not change.
Latency and Throughput at Production Scale
A common objection to inline enforcement is latency. If every action requires an evaluation pass, does that add unacceptable delay?
Vaikora’s enforcement latency is P50 8ms and P99 45ms. At scale, it sustains 10,000 or more actions per second. For most agent workflows, 45ms at the 99th percentile is well within acceptable bounds, particularly when the alternative is running without any enforcement at all.
The gateway is open source under the MIT license, written in Python, and published on PyPI as vaikora-guard-mcp. It is self-hostable. The commercial product is the Vaikora Control Plane, hosted by Data443, which adds centralized policy management, the audit chain, and the SIEM integrations.
Auditability: Every Decision, Tamper-Evident
Every policy decision Vaikora makes is written to a SHA-256 hash-chained audit log. The chain is tamper-evident: any modification to a past record breaks the chain and is detectable. This gives compliance teams an ordered, verifiable record of what every AI agent was permitted or denied, at what time, for what reason, covering every action evaluated.
Compliance presets ship for SOC 2, HIPAA, GDPR, PCI-DSS, and ISO 27001. These are preconfigured policy sets aligned to the control requirements of each framework, not documentation templates.
Vaikora integrates natively with Microsoft Sentinel, Microsoft Defender, SentinelOne, CrowdStrike Falcon, and AWS Security Hub. High-severity AI agent threats are pushed into SentinelOne as Threat Intelligence indicators with severity mapping at Critical=100, High=75, Medium=50, and Low=25. High-severity risk events are promoted into Azure Security Center and Microsoft Defender for Cloud as native incidents without custom engineering.
This means AI agent risk surfaces in the same workflows your security operations team already uses, with no separate console to monitor.
What to Check in Your Current Setup
If you have AI agents making tool calls today, start with these questions:
- Is there any control between the agent’s decision to act and the action completing, or does the agent call tools with only application-layer permissions as a guardrail?
- If an agent was misconfigured or manipulated through prompt injection, what stops it from reaching data it should not touch?
- Can you produce a tamper-evident, time-ordered record of every agent action for a compliance audit?
- Do high-risk agent events flow into your existing SIEM, or do they require a separate investigation workflow?
If the answers are "no", "nothing", "no", and "separate workflow", the enforcement gap is real and worth closing before an agent operates at scale in a production environment.